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Abstract 
 
 
Economics rests upon a set of presumptions about how human beings are 
affected by income.  Yet causal evidence is scant.  This paper reports a 
longitudinal study of randomly selected lottery winners.  Remarkably, we 
show that it takes almost three years before they enjoy their money.  We 
develop a model of dissonance and deservingness.  We argue that, despite 
the tradition of economics, human beings may weight differently the 
different kinds of income that accrue to them.  If so, it is not sufficient to 
describe utility by a function u(y), and it is not true that ‘a dollar is a dollar’. 
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 Delay and Deservingness after Winning the Lottery 
Andrew J Oswald 
Rainer Winkelmann 
 
“One of the main things for me was whether I deserved it, deserved to win”. 
— A recent US state lottery winner (quoted in Smith 2002) 
 
“When we won, we looked at each other, me and Karen, and thought why us?" Mr Ryan said 
candidly after his win. "Because to be honest, I'm not the most deserving person”. 
— Quoted in The Independent newspaper in the UK (Independent 1996) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economists are deeply interested in income and its consequences for human beings.  
One of the fundamental ideas in the discipline is that, because it allows individuals to 
buy extra goods, greater financial resources bring higher utility.  The tradition in 
economics has been to assume that a dollar is a dollar is a dollar -- in other words that 
income from one source is the same as that from another1. 
 
We provide longitudinal evidence that sheds doubt on this way of thinking.  We study 
lottery windfalls.  After laying out the data, the paper turns to an analytical model.  
Our conceptual approach, which is motivated partly by the quotes at the beginning of 
the paper, builds upon the possibility that lottery winners may not immediately feel 
that they deserve their win.  We are conscious that such terminology is unfamiliar in, 
and perhaps even antithetical to, standard economics.  This paper uses the specific 
empirical example to draw wider implications. 
 
The paper can be seen as a contribution to the incorporation of emotions into 
economics (Elster 1998).  Cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens 1982) later 
plays a particular role.   
 
2.Lotteries as a Natural Experiment in Exogenous Income Windfalls  
 
Real-life lotteries provide the economist with a quasi-laboratory setting in which 
individuals receive much bigger sums than can be distributed in a conventional social-
                                                 
1 The tradition is, of course, to assume that people maximize v(x) st. y=px, so that utility can 
be written as a function of income u(y) with given prices p suppressed from the notation, and 
x a vector of goods.  Then y is a kind of sufficient statistic for utility or well-being.    
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science laboratory experiment.  The first part of the paper is straightforwardly 
empirical.  Using data from a German panel, it examines how an approximately 
exogenous windfall of cash affects people’s well-being2.   
 
Strikingly, for the first two years after a windfall, we cannot find any statistically 
significant effect on our sample of winners.  The reasons we take seriously what is, in 
a sense, a non-result, and do not view it merely as a consequence of measurement 
error, are threefold: 
(i) the data set is particularly suitable for the task, and is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the world’s largest source of longitudinal data on lottery 
winners;  
(ii) the paper’s point estimates themselves are close to zero; 
(iii) there are precedents for the non-finding in the literature (both the results of 
Brickman et al 1978 and the newer work of Kuhn et al 2008 conclude that 
lottery winners are not happier).   
 
Nevertheless, we find that lottery wins are not forever neutral.  Eventually, by the 
third year after a win, the data reveal large effects.   
 
The design is the following.   
 
First, we use a random sample of individuals.  These are nationally representative data 
(for Germany).  We follow people for some years, and observe them before and after 
a windfall.   
 
Second, by studying lottery winners, we argue that it is reasonable to treat windfall 
money as approximately exogenous.  More exactly, we compare those with 
substantial lottery wins to people who receive tiny wins.  This design allows us to 
come close to the ideal kind of test -- one that no social-science funder would 
authorize -- which would be a giant experiment where some subjects were randomly 
allocated large sums of cash.   
 
                                                 
2 We do not study health, but Lindahl (2005) and Apouey and Clark (2008) attempt to do so. 
 3
Third, the lottery prizes are not small: they range in size up to the equivalent of one 
million US dollars.  These are paid as lump sums.   
 
Fourth, although our sample size on substantial winners is inevitably not enormous (at 
approximately 200 observations), the data set spans a long enough period to allow us 
to check the key findings in each of two subsamples of time.  This replication works 
surprisingly strongly.  We find, robustly, a delayed effect of a windfall upon reported 
levels of contentment. 
 
The second part of the paper suggests a model in which lottery wins lead to cognitive 
dissonance.  Initially, people do not feel they deserve the money as fully as they 
deserve their actual earned income.  Over time they adapt, and eventually come to 
enjoy their lottery income.  The model is highly stylized, but it captures the essential 
idea.  It builds upon and is inspired by the (non-mathematical) theorizing of the 
psychologist Norman Feather, in sources such as Feather (1999), Feather et al (2001), 
and Feather and Johnstone (2001), and the work of economists such as Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982) and Konow (2000).  Fong and Luttmer (2007) is one of the few recent 
papers by economists to touch empirically upon the idea of deservingness3. 
 
The paper’s evidence also disposes of one much-repeated idea.  It is the view that 
lottery wins initially make people very happy but that this happiness erodes away over 
the ensuing years as winners habituate to the money.  Our data suggest the reverse.  
There is initially no impact4 and then eventually a large one. 
 
3. Empirics 
 
The paper’s analysis of satisfaction after a lottery pay-out is based on a comparison of 
small and large winners using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel.  For the 
social scientist interested in understanding the consequences of money for people’s 
lives, lotteries have a number of well-known advantages.  Conditional on playing, 
                                                 
3 A search on the American Economic Review, Economic Journal, and Quarterly Journal of 
Economics finds no papers with ‘deservingness’ or ‘deservedness’ in the title, abstract or key-
words.  The same is true of a search on Psychological Science and Psychological Review. 
4 It might well be plausible to expect an initial elation effect, in the first week of hearing the 
news, but we are unable to examine that in our annual data. 
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winning is serendipitous.  The assignment of winners to big or small amounts is also 
random, and the causal effect of a large lottery win among lottery players can be 
established by comparing outcomes across the two groups. 5
 
We follow the general identification strategy employed in papers such as Imbens et al. 
(2001) -- although those authors did not have access to longitudinal data on winners. 
 
Information on lottery wins was collected in the German Socio-Economic Panel for 
the first time in the 2000 survey, and is now available up to, and including, 2007. 
Using this type of data rather than, say, a follow-up survey of winners has a number 
of advantages. The main one, apart from representativeness, is that the panel 
information can be used to construct a time-window for each household.  In our case, 
we will look at measurements of winners both before the actual win and up to three 
years after. In this way, we can uncover any slow-acting and dynamic effects of 
winning, and distinguish between 1-period (immediate), 2-period (medium term) and 
3-period (longer term) effects.  Identifying the time path of these effects is key to our 
later ideas on deservingness and income. 
 
A disadvantage of studying lottery winnings in a representative-household survey is 
that the sample of winners is fairly small.  Although it is estimated that around 1/3 of 
the German population play regularly in the lottery, winning is of course much less 
common.  This problem is compounded by the fact that only “significant” prizes are 
recorded in the German Socio-Economic Panel.  Moreover, the definition of what it 
means to be significant has shifted over time.  The initial cut-off imposed by the 
questionnaire design was 5000 DM in 2000 and 2001.  It was then converted to 2500 
                                                 
5 Although causality remains debatable and debated, a large literature has established in micro 
data a positive correlation between people’s happiness and income (for a large range of 
countries).  Frijters et al (2004) is arguably one of the papers to come closest to a causal test.  
Detailed results are given in sources such as Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Clark et al 
(2008a), Di Tella et al (2001), Frey and Stuzer (2002), Luttmer (2005), Shields and Wheatley 
Price (2005), Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) and 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998).  Kahneman et al (2006), however, is doubtful of the 
existence of any large causal effect of money on human well-being; the paper argues that 
mood is only marginally affected by income.   Clark et al (2008b), Diener (1999), Easterlin 
(2003) and Oswald (1997) review the evidence.  Our paper also has a potential overlap with 
the stigma from benefit income as studied by Haisken-New (2008).   
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Euros between 2002 and 2004, and lowered to 500 Euros from 2005 onwards.  Most 
lottery wins fall below these thresholds and are therefore not recorded at all.  
 
As a consequence, in the German Panel there are, in total, 271 observations on 
persons in a winning household.  This number is reduced to 198 observations once (i) 
minors and young persons (under the age of 25) at home are excluded, as are (ii) those 
who do not provide valid financial satisfaction responses before and immediately after 
the time of win.  The available information is thus limited, even in the absence of 
further aggravating factors such as potential misreporting.   
 
However, the benefits of analyzing lottery wins from a truly dynamic perspective with 
longitudinal data seem to outweigh these disadvantages, even though the uncertainty 
associated with any estimate will not be negligible. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 set out the main patterns in the raw data.   
 
In our final sample of 198 winners, the minimum amount (after converting DM 
amounts into Euros, and adjusting for inflation, with base year 2000) is 446 Euros, 
and the maximum amount is 681,202 Euros.  We wish to make comparisons of 
outcomes within the sample of players.  Our working presumption is that a small win 
will not materially affect an individual when he or she is interviewed in the next 
sweep of the panel.  Hence we divide the data.  In order to define substantial winners 
compared to small winners, in a way that avoids the charge that our chosen split was 
deliberately picked to obtain particular results, we simply split the sample of all 
winners in the middle.  Therefore, all amounts below the median of 3633 Euros are 
referred to as ‘small wins’.  Our experiments -- available upon request -- suggest that 
the exact choice of split does not alter the paper’s fundamental findings.   
 
The average win in this group was 1668 Euros.  The average win in the group of 
larger winners was 31,539 Euros.  We treat the former as a kind of control group and 
thus measure the effects of a substantial win. 
 
Because the German panel is not a survey of expenditure or consumption, we focus 
on income as the main variable of interest. 
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 We study people at each of four time points.  To get as close as possible to how 
windfalls affect people’s feelings about income and their financial situation, we do 
not concentrate upon ‘happiness’ data or an equivalent broad measure.  Instead, we 
focus more narrowly.  Our data are on overall satisfaction-with-the-household’s-
income on a zero to ten scale.  For simplicity, we sometimes later refer to this as a 
person’s financial satisfaction. 
 
Define financial satisfaction in time period t0 as the satisfaction reported before the 
lottery win took place.  For a lottery win that is reported in year t1, the direct 1-period 
impact on satisfaction is therefore based on an examination of the difference of 
satisfaction in t minus satisfaction in t0.  For part of the sample of winners, we also 
observe financial satisfaction in t2 and in t3.  Therefore, we can also define a medium 
term impact, satisfaction in t2 minus satisfaction in t0, and a longer term impact, 
satisfaction in t3 minus satisfaction in t0. 
 
We perform the analysis in two ways – both as a simple t-test viewing a substantial 
lottery win as a treatment when compared to small wins as a control group, and by 
estimating regression equations with other factors such as education held constant.  
Each leads to the same broad conclusions.   
 
Table 3 reports the findings.  The upper left panel shows the 1-period results for the 
full sample.  Model (1) provides results without an adjustment for further controls; 
Model (2) includes those controls, which include a range of the usual socio-economic 
characteristics.  To guard against possible endogeneity (e.g., large winners might 
adjust their employment status in response to the win: see Imbens et al 2001) these 
socio-economic characteristics are measured prior to winning.  Since here a large 
windfall is a random event, and thus orthogonal to other personal characteristics, 
conditional on playing we would not expect the inclusion of these variables to lead to 
major changes in the point estimates.  We would, however, expect an increase in 
efficiency -- since the variance of the unexplained regression component is reduced. 
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Table 3 reveals that in the first year a lottery win has no effect.  From column (1), the 
average financial satisfaction of large lottery winners is paradoxically actually slightly 
below -- by -0.112 points on a ten point scale -- that of small winners.   
 
This holds true even of our single largest observed winner (if we extract that person as 
a particular data point).  Strikingly, that person receives the equivalent of 1 million US 
dollars but reports a fall, in time t1, in financial satisfaction (ie. satisfaction with the 
household’s income). 
 
Based on a t-statistic of 0.4, we conclude from the first block of data in Table 3 that 
there is no evidence that receiving a big lottery pay-out increases a person’s 
satisfaction in the short run.  The point estimate turns positive when controls are 
included, but it remains small and insignificant, both economically and statistically. 
Moving to columns (3) and (4), we see the 2-period results, i.e. the change in financial 
satisfaction of large winners between t0 and t2, relative to the change for small 
winners.  The sample size drops from 188 to 145 observations, because a fraction of 
the sample is not observed for two periods following the win, either because the win 
occurred in 2006, or because the person dropped out of the survey.  But the 
substantive conclusions remain the same. There is surprisingly little difference in a 
person’s reported financial satisfaction for the two groups, and thus even in time t2 
there is no discernible effect of winning a large amount.  This is, on average, 18 
months after the lottery win, because t1 measures people on average 6 months after 
they initially won.  
 
However, this changes when we turn to a longer lag.   
 
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 provide the 3-period results.  In contrast to the case 
for earlier periods, there is now an effect, and it is large.  The point estimates exceed 
one, indicating that predicted financial satisfaction of large winners is now more than 
one point higher, on average, on a 0-10 scale, than it would have been in the case of a 
small win only.  The t-statistics are 2.5 (in the model without controls) and 3.0 (in the 
model with controls) respectively, so that the null hypothesis of no effect in period t3 
can be rejected. 
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4. Checks and Counter-Arguments 
 
There remains some possibility that these results are spurious, and are due to the small 
samples on which they are based.  We were concerned about that.  To check for 
robustness, therefore, we split the sample into two parts, across time, and repeated the 
analysis for each of two subsamples.  The first span of data is for the period 1999-
2002, and the second is for the period 2003-2006.  
 
These principal robustness checks are shown in the lower panels of Table 3 and 
produce encouraging conclusions.  Remarkably, the key pattern is replicated in each 
of the two subsamples.  In both instances, there is no effect in t1 and t2, but there is a 
large effect in t3.  It is approximately 2 financial-satisfaction points in each 
subsample.  
 
To summarize, the effect of a large lottery win on financial satisfaction is much more 
delayed than an economist would have expected.6 It takes between two and three 
years until a substantial positive effect materializes.  Given the findings, we checked 
the data set to make certain that lottery wins were being translated into higher 
reported incomes, and they were (results available upon request).  Yet those financial 
gains do not spill over into people’s answers on how they feel. 
 
Some further, if indirect, corroboration comes from the work of Gardner and Oswald 
(2007) and Apouey and Clark (2008).  They find no immediate effect of lottery wins 
on mental health in Great Britain, but can detect an effect some years later.  Because 
of the rather different nature of the dependent variable, and the much smaller lottery 
prizes in these investigators’ British data, we do not wish to emphasize those results 
too strongly.  But they are consistent with the tenor of our findings. 
 
It does not seem easy to interpret these findings through the lens of conventional 
economic theory.  Income has risen exogenously here, in an unpredicted way, and yet 
satisfaction if anything declines in the first period after a win.  A plausible account for 
                                                 
6 The standard model of life-cycle behavior, with the interest rate equal to the rate of time 
preference, predicts that utility would jump up in a once-and-for-all way, and then run flat at 
that higher level.     
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weak results in t1 and t2 could be created from the assumption of large amounts of 
measurement error in the data; but that account breaks down with the well-determined 
t3 results (found, importantly, in both subsamples). 
 
As a benchmark, Table 4 shows -- although by definition the quality of causality is 
less clearly established -- that the effects of wage income show up immediately in the 
person’s feelings of satisfaction.  
 
Table 5 moves to life-satisfaction data.  Encouragingly, the same broad pattern -- in 
the top row of the table there is an initial fall in life satisfaction but then by t3 it is 
approximately 0.3 points higher than t0 -- can be seen, although the standard errors 
are large.  For that reason, it is natural to concentrate on the financial satisfaction data. 
 
As one further check, we examined whether the findings are robust to the use of a 
consistent sample -- one in which the individuals do not change through time7.  We 
find that they are (the overall sample, being balanced, is then necessarily smaller).  
Results are available upon request.   
 
Alternatively, might it be that the phenomenon is a result of people using a technical 
definition of income -- as answering implicitly: “no, my satisfaction with income is 
not higher, because although I have received a large windfall I do not count that as 
household income”?  First, for the average citizen, technical sophistication in the 
distinction between income and wealth windfalls lacks the ring of plausibility, and we 
know from the income reports that surveyed individuals do record the money as 
greater income.  Second, such an interpretation would not predict the near-3-year 
delay followed by the observed large rise in satisfaction.  Instead, if the effect happens 
merely because people count as income only the interest on lottery windfalls, then the 
effect would show up as soon as it arrives in their bank accounts, namely, 
immediately in our annual data.  Third, the qualitative pattern through time is seen 
also in the life-satisfaction responses, which would not be predicted by a windfalls-
are-not-income account. 
 
                                                 
7 We are grateful to Alan Krueger for this suggestion. 
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Finally, one could reason in the following way A possible explanation for the lag is 
that a lottery win disrupts identity ("Who am I? What do I value? Who are my 
friends?") and it takes time to develop a new one.  In the first few years, having 
money is inconsistent with person’s normal way of living, and it takes some years to 
learn to be a person who has money.  So it may not be that lottery money is less 
valuable than salary money; rather, winnings may do what salary money does to make 
us feel good, but it may have the ‘additional’ effect of making us feel bad in different 
ways.  However, the difficulty with this line of argument here is that it seems likely to 
apply to the winning of millions rather than, as typically in our data set, the winning 
of thousands.  Receiving 30,000 Euros may be an important event to a person but not 
in itself identity-changing. 8   
 
5. Deservingness and Lottery Wins: A Model of Cognitive Behaviour 
 
We now try to make sense of this pattern9.  It is not possible to establish 
unambiguously why the individuals in our sample take so long to gain satisfaction 
from their windfall.  Nevertheless, this section proposes a utility-maximizing model 
of a lottery winner.   
 
Assume that the lottery win has just been announced.  Let u(.) be a concave utility 
function defined over total income.  Income comes in two forms: a fixed salary y and 
a flow of income i taken from the lottery win.  An endogenous salary can be 
introduced into the model without altering the main points. 
 
The win is a given sum of money, L, that is announced at time 0.  The individual 
decides at each point in time how much of the cash to use per annum -- that is, how 
                                                 
8 We thank Dan Gilbert for valuable suggestions on this.   
9 Two possibilities are that (i) people take some years to purchase goods with their lottery 
winnings or (ii) it takes time to appreciate money just as it does to appreciate fine wine.  
However, neither of these is predicted by standard economic theory, and neither seems 
plausible.  A third, a ‘lucky charm’ theory, is that winners feel good because they interpret the 
financial luck as a sign of a generic change in their chances in future random events; but, 
contrary to our data, this theory would predict a flat-rate effect, independently of the windfall 
size.  A fourth, which is close in spirit to the changed-identity theory discussed earlier, is a 
disruption theory: winning shakes up people’s lives in an uncomfortable way.  But this would 
predict a fast drop at time t1 rather than a higher utility level per se later on.  Moreover, again, 
most of our wins are too small for this account to seem truly persuasive. 
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large the drawings i should be in each period -- from the entire stock of lottery 
winnings L; she can, for example, consume it all early on, or wait and spend money 
later.  Time is continuous and runs from 0 to T. 
   
Earned income is seen by the person as money which she intrinsically deserves.  
Lottery income, by contrast, is not viewed in the same way.  The individual does not 
think immediately that she is fully ‘deserving’ of the money.  In her mind, she marks 
down the utility value of the flow of lottery income by a coefficient D, which lies 
between zero and unity.  Intuitively, until the individual comes to terms with the win, 
this is a kind of psychic ‘tax’.  If D is 0.5, for example, the person is indifferent 
between salary income of $1 and lottery income of $2.   
 
This gap can be thought of as a form of cognitive dissonance.  Through time, 
however, the individual can persuade herself that she is deserving of the lottery 
money.  This -- the erosion of the dissonance -- happens slowly.  It requires effort e.  
The cost of effort is a convex function c(e).  By investing psychological resources, she 
can gradually build up the deservingness level, D, in her own mind.  But doing so 
causes mental strain along the way.  This is a kind of reverse-adaptation theory. 
 
In terms of the earlier data, we will think of u(.) as proxying the satisfaction from 
income.  Overall satisfaction or well-being, correspondingly, is instead given each 
period by u(.) – c(e). 
 
Discounting does not alter the nature of the optimization, so for simplicity is omitted.  
A discount rate r can easily be introduced into the model. 
 
The person thus maximizes lifetime utility subject to, first, a lottery-win budget 
constraint and, second, a differential equation constraint on the rate of change of 
deservingness D.  The problem in full is: in each period choose psychological effort, 
e, and the amount of lottery winnings drawn down, i, to solve  
 
Maximize  Lifetime utility dteciDyu
T
])()([
0
∫ −+
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 subject to four constraints: 
 
Ldti
T
≤∫
0
 Lottery-win budget constraint 
DeD δ−=&  Adjustment-of-deservingness equation 
 
10 ≤≤ D  Bounded deservingness 
 
ee ≤≤0  Bounded effort 
 
where deservingness D lies in the unit interval, e lies between zero and e-bar, the time 
rate of change of a variable is marked by a dot, and D depreciates at rate .δ   It is not 
necessary for the analysis that the rate of depreciation be strictly positive, and we 
return to this issue at a later point.  
 
A value of D=1 corresponds to full deservingness.  In this case, the person treats wage 
income and lottery income as identically valuable inside their utility function.  By 
assumption, the deservingness parameter D cannot exceed unity, nor go negative.  
Effort e is assumed to lie in a closed interval, and also, by assumption, cannot go 
negative. 
 
Form the Hamiltonian 
 
)(][)()( DeiLeciDyuH δψλ −+−+−+=  
 
where lambda is a multiplier that is constant (ie, independent of time) and psi is a 
multiplier that is dependent on time.  Lambda here is independent of t because it 
corresponds to an integral constraint.  In the model, the value of lambda is closely 
linked to the marginal utility of income, whereas psi is the shadow price of 
deservingness. 
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The necessary conditions for an optimum, from Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, 
are: 
 
0)( =−+′= λDiDyuHi   (1) 
 
0)( ≤+′−= ψecHe    (2) 
 
ψδψ ++′−=−= iiDyuHD )(&  (3) 
 
DeD δ−=&     (4) 
 
.0)()( =TTD ψ    (5) 
 
When (2) holds as a strict equality, these characterize an optimal interior solution.  In 
some circumstances, bang-bang solutions (with variables set at corners) may be the 
optimal outcome. 
 
Equation 1 requires that the (deservingness-adjusted) marginal utility of income be 
the same in each time period.  With D=1, the condition collapses to the conventional 
form found in optimal lifetime consumption models.  Equation 2 determines the 
instantaneous value of the shadow price of deservingness, which is given by the 
marginal cost of psychological effort, namely, the first derivative of c(e).  Equation 3 
is the equation of motion of deservingness’s shadow price, ψ .  Equation 4 reproduces 
the dynamics of how deservingness builds up over time.  Equation 5 is a transversality 
condition.   
 
Figure 1 describes a typical outcome.  Over time, a rational individual invests -- 
perhaps only subconsciously -- in building up his or her sense of deservingness.  
When that deservingness level hits a value D*, a steady state ensues.   
 
It seems natural to assume that deservingness D begins, in time t=0 when the 
individual learns of the lottery win, close to zero.  The model requires some 
assumption of this type about the initial value D(0).  
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 From equation 1, the derivative of utility with respect to income is in each period  
 
D
iDyu λ=+′ )(   (6) 
 
where the multiplier lambda is a constant.  This can be thought of as the 
deservingness-scaled marginal utility of income.  The expression means that as 
deservingness D rises so the right hand side of (6) declines and hence the value of 
 must itself decline.  The value of D cannot literally be zero at the starting point, 
t=0, if (6) is to hold as a well-behaved interior optimum.   
(.)u′
 
Equation (6) is simple but powerful.  Because u(.) is strictly concave, y+iD must 
move inversely with D.  Thus total effective income y+iD rises through time as D 
increases.  Hence the income-driven part of the utility function, u(.), is also increasing 
over time.  This establishes that as deservingness D increases it must be the case that 
the utility from income goes up. 
 
Within this framework, as depicted in Figure 1, the characteristic of all but 
pathological cases is thus that utility starts close to, or lower than, the original pre-
lottery level.   
 
This is for three reasons.  First, the individual sets high effort e to try to bring up her 
sense of deservingness D.  That is a source of mental strain and acts, ceteris paribus, 
to pull down the person’s utility from the level prevailing just before the 
announcement of the lottery win (when the person had had no need to put in effort to 
rationalize their own income, which was only from salary).  Second, the optimizing 
individual does start to draw upon lottery income, because now recognizes that she 
will be richer over her lifetime, so that it is rational for her to bring forward new 
spending.  But now the consequence of every dollar spent is a smaller utility gain than 
from an equivalent dollar of salary income; this is because each lottery dollar is 
downgraded by parameter D.  Third, in turn, this downgrading makes it less desirable 
in the early periods to consume from the lottery winnings L.  Other things constant, it 
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is preferable to wait a few periods, to allow the deservingness level to rise, and thus to 
allow the money eventually to be more fully enjoyed. 
 
If horizon time T goes to infinity, the model’s solution converges to a steady state 
path, and that solution is characterized by 
 
δ*)('**)*( eciDiyu =+′  (7) 
 
.** De δ=    (8) 
 
The individual continues to put in psychological effort to maintain her sense of 
deservingness, but only at level e* necessary to cover the level of depreciation. 
 
Two special and simple cases are the following. 
 
A:  When u(.) is linear, it is optimal to build up D as slowly as possible, and to 
consume all the L lottery win in the final few periods, or whenever D first reaches the 
value of unity.  The reason is that there is no gain from consuming in any particular 
period, so it pays to wait as long as feasible. 
 
B:   When c(.) is zero as well, there is a so-called bang-bang solution.  It is optimal 
straight away to set effort e to its maximum level, e .   The individual adjusts 
psychologically as quickly as possible, while leaving the lottery winnings intact.  
Then, when D hits unity, the consumption of lottery winnings can begin. 
 
One issue is how the per-period lottery-drawings i are set in each period as the level 
of deservingness D rises through time.  Here the structure of equation 1 means that 
what matters is the conventional degree of relative risk aversion of the u(.) utility 
function. 
 
This follows easily from differentiating throughout the inter-temporal optimality 
requirement, equation 1: 
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which, after rearrangement, and multiplication throughout by D/i, gives the 
expression: 
 
]1
(.)
(.)1[
Diu
u
i
D
dD
di
′′
′+−=   (10) 
 
Or simply 
 
11 −= ηi
D
dD
di     (11) 
 
where eta is the degree of relative risk aversion.   
 
Therefore, in the useful benchmark case where eta is equal to unity, it follows that if 
deservingness increases through time the variables i and D rise together in exact 
proportion.  Then, as eta lies above (or below) unity, lottery income is drawn on less 
(or more) through time.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
When we began this work, we expected to find that people like winning the lottery 
and that such wins quickly improve the quality of people’s lives.  This is what most 
economists, and economics textbooks, would predict.  But the facts do not support 
such a conclusion.   
 
Instead, these longitudinal data, which have the advantage of following randomly 
selected people before they win the lottery and for some years afterwards, reveal a 
strikingly delayed effect.  Even for a measure of financial satisfaction -- chosen here 
because it is so naturally the domain of lottery winnings -- we cannot discern any 
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impact upon people for a full 2 years10.  Then, a large effect becomes visible.  By the 
third year, a person’s satisfaction with their household’s income is markedly higher if 
they earlier had a substantial win on the lottery.  The control group in this calculation 
is effectively those with small wins.  The effect is highly robust in subsamples. 11  
 
The paper’s evidence also disposes of one commonly heard idea -- the view that 
lottery wins can initially make people happy but that such an effect on well-being 
quickly erodes as individuals adapt hedonically to a new standard of living.  There is 
much folk-lore on this, and Brickman et al (1978) proposes the same idea, but it is not 
consistent with these data.    
 
Building upon the psychological literature on deservingness12, we have suggested a 
formal model that is consistent with the facts observed in our data.  In the model, 
people suffer from cognitive dissonance when they win.  Initially, they do not feel 
they deserve the windfall, and this reduces the marginal utility of their lottery income.  
They slowly invest in psychological effort to persuade themselves of their 
deservingness, and the utility from income then rises through time.  They come to 
enjoy the money.  In the model, we have attempted to distinguish between the 
satisfaction from income u(.) and overall satisfaction or utility u(.) - c(e).  The model 
is placed second in the paper because it is an attempt ex post to make sense of the 
patterns found empirically. 
 
Interestingly, in the German language, there is a single verb "verdienen" which means 
both "to earn" (as a payment for work) and "to deserve".  The main hypothesis of this 
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that 2 years is how long it takes humans to adapt to other hedonic shocks, 
such as bereavement and divorce (Clark et al 2008a).  In this paper, we study what might be 
thought of as a form of ‘negative adaptation’.  
11 As explained in the paper, this effect cannot be because winners draw a subtle definitional 
distinction between windfall wealth and income.  If as a lottery winner I put 100,000 dollars 
into the bank, at an interest rate of 5%, then I get 5000 dollars per annum straight away, 
namely, in the first year.  After three years, I am still receiving 5000 dollars a year in interest 
(or marginally more if, contrary to the spirit of the life-cycle model, I have compounded it 
all).  Therefore it is not true that investing the windfall sum will only slowly lead to an up-
rating of my income, and correspondingly not true that the patterns in our data can be 
explained by such an account.  
12 We have found little published empirical research on deservingness and lottery wins, 
although Callan et al (2006) touches upon the issue.   
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paper -- that some forms of income are perceived as more deserved than others -- is 
thus in a sense anticipated in the culture and vocabulary. 
 
Whatever the correct theoretical interpretation, and further inquiry will be necessary, 
the paper has shown that lottery income and wage income are not identical in their 
consequences.  Despite the traditions of economics, human beings may weight 
differently the different kinds of income that accrue to them.  If so, it is not sufficient 
to describe utility by a function u(y), and it is not true that ‘a dollar is a dollar’.  
 
This study is at best only a start on the concept of deservingness-adjusted dollars.  
However, we believe the idea may have applications in many settings in social 
science.  Money may not be as homogeneous, and psychologically fungible, as the 
discipline of economics13 has presumed. 
                                                 
13 With a small number of honorable exceptions, such as Thaler (1990). 
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 Table 1: Descriptive Data 
 
                         Small winners 
 
Substantial winners 
 
        `                mean  s.e.  mean  s.e. 
Financial 
Satisfaction (with 
household 
income)  
6.64  0.21  6.81  0.20 
Household 
Income        
46632.1  4275.1  39674.6  1955.7 
Household Size       2.64  0.11  2.99  0.11 
Years of 
Schooling      
12.16  0.26  11.77  0.25 
Employed 
(Yes=1)        
0.81  0.04  0.63  0.05 
Unemployed 
(Yes=1)      
0.01  0.01  0.06  0.02 
Male (Yes=1)          0.53  0.05  0.50  0.05 
Age                      47.3  1.2  49.9  1.5 
German (Yes=1)     0.94  0.02  0.90  0.03 
Married (Yes=1)     0.69  0.05  0.73  0.04 
Single (Yes=1)        0.18  0.04  0.11  0.03 
Size of lottery win   1668.1  96.4  31539.5  9584.4 
         
 Observations  101    103   
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Table 2: Amounts Won (in real Euros) 
  
Year     # of 
households 
# of 
persons   
 Av. 
Amount   
 Minimum 
   
   Maximum    
2000      7        12      9244.8    3000.0   30000.0          
2001      9        17      6558.4    2455.8   17190.6          
2002      10       16      103665.7  2476.7   681201.6       
2003      13       25      14028.0   2396.9   95877.3          
2004      6        13      5481.0    2544.8   9425.1           
2005      27       42      13060.8   462.1    184842.9        
2006      23       42      4833.2    454.1    42234.3          
2007      22       37      9796.4    446.0    89206.1          
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Table 3: Longitudinal Changes in the Financial Satisfaction of Lottery Winners  
(Comparing Before and After a Win in year t1) 
 
  Difference t1-t0 Difference t2-t0  Difference t3-t0
 
Full sample    (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
Substantial lottery win    -0.112 0.068 0.066 0.067   1.148  1.429
    (0.35) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)   (2.44)  (2.73)
Equation controls    No Yes No Yes   No  Yes
N    188 188 145 145   94  94
 
1999-2002 subsample                   
Substantial lottery win    -0.060 0.001 0.017 0.215   1.341  1.897
    (0.10) (0.00) (0.03) (0.46)   (2.25)  (3.21)
Equation controls    No Yes No Yes   No  Yes
N    65 65 61 61   55  55
 
2003-2006 subsample                   
Substantial lottery win    0.104 0.202 0.441 0.283   1.563  2.055
    (0.24) (0.43) (0.91) (0.61)   (1.89)  (2.28)
Equation controls    No Yes No Yes   No  Yes
N    123 123 84 84   39  39
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 1999-2007. 
Notes:  
t-statistics in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the household level. 
The dependent variable is in life-satisfaction points, on a scale from zero to ten.  
The omitted, comparison group is those with a small win.  
t-0 signifies the year before the win. t-3 signifies the third year after the lottery win. 
Equation controls include Employment, Household size, Male, Age, Age squared, German, Married, 
Never Married (excluded category: Separated, divorced or widowed), Years of education, Logarithmic 
household income, and Health satisfaction in t0. 
The exact question in the German Panel, which forms the dependent variable, is: “How satisfied are 
you today with … your household’s income, on a zero to ten scale, where zero stands for totally 
dissatisfied and ten stands for totally satisfied.” 
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Table 4: The Immediate Impact of Wage Income on Financial Satisfaction 
 
Dependent variable: Change in Satisfaction t-1 to t     
The independent variables are: 
Change in log net earnings 
from… 
     
t-1 to t    0.386    0.372    0.378    0.345    
                   (7.47)   (7.19)   (5.74)   (5.18)   
t-2 to t-1                           0.116    0.092    
                                     (1.60)   (1.24)   
t-3 to t-2                           0.042    0.020    
                                     (0.07)   (0.03)   
                                                       
Controls           No       Yes      No       Yes      
                                                       
Observations       9574     9574     7872     7872     
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 2004-2007. 
Notes:  
t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is the change in financial satisfaction between 2006 
and 2007 among those receiving a wage income.  
Equation controls include Employment, Household size, Male, Age, Age squared, German, Married, 
Never Married (excluded category: Separated, divorced or widowed), Years of education, and Health 
satisfaction in t. 
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Table 5 
Longitudinal Changes in the Life Satisfaction of Lottery Winners  
 (Comparing Before and After a Win in year t1) 
 
 Difference t1-t0 Difference t2-t0  Difference t3-t0
 
Full sample (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Substantial lottery win -0. 242 -0. 225 -0.275 -0.203  0.197 0.352
 (0.96) (0.94) (0.89) (0.63)  (0.45) (0.77)
Equation controls No Yes No Yes  No Yes
N 198 196 149 147  97 95
 
1999-2002 subsample          
Substantial lottery win -0.280 -0.522 0.062 0.095  0.269 0.244
 (0.68) (1.21) (0.13) (0.14)  (0.38) (0.36)
Equation controls No Yes No Yes  No Yes
N 66 66 61 61  55 55
 
2003-2006 subsample          
Substantial lottery win -0.079 -0.044 0.032 0.194  0.300 0.639
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.07) (0.47)  (0.41) (0.59)
Equation controls No Yes No Yes  No Yes
N 132 130 88 86  42 40
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 1999-2007. 
Notes:  
t-statistics in parentheses.  
The dependent variable is in life-satisfaction points, on a scale from zero to ten.  
The omitted, comparison group is those with a small win.  
t-0 signifies the year before the win. t-3 signifies the third year after the lottery win. 
Equation controls include Employment, Household size, Male, Age, Age squared, German, Married, 
Never Married (excluded category: Separated, divorced or widowed), Years of education, Logarithmic 
household income, and Health satisfaction in t0. 
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